Germany were so efficiently rampant four summers ago in South Africa, that it came as a surprise to many when they fell relatively flat against the eventual champions Spain in the semi final. It may arguably have been the first time that this emerging crop of German players faced off against a top quality side capable of matching them tactically, but its also no secret that Spain never hit top gear in 2010, and were there for the taking if Germany could continue to show the clinical attacking that dispatched England and Argentina.
The 4-2-3-1 employed by LÓ§w perfectly displayed the benefits of the system dominating European football, his bank of two sitting midfielders covered onrushing their full backs while also distributing the ball forward to the many attacking options the system allows you to use. The question remained for LÓ§w however, how could such a clearly incredible German team, with a squad probably better all round than their competitors fall short not just in 2010, but at Euro 2012 also, where a much less impressive Italian team manged to bat them off rather comfortably. Well, a bit of light may have been shone on this question against Portugal.
Switching to a more dynamic 4-3-3 yesterday, Mesut Ó¦zil and Mario GÓ§tze found themselves with infinite space to express themselves and run beyond Muller in attack. The midfield three, including the sitting Khedira and the all action Philippe Lahm gave Toni Kroos the perfect backup to distribute the ball in the middle of the park, something he has arguably never had before in the national side.
Germany were always going to dominate their qualifying group for this tournament with little trouble, which gave LÓ§w a good margin for experimentation, which he seems to have done successfully. It is remarkably odd how few strikers Germany’s very proficient youth system has brought through compared to what its produced at every other position, and it is that issue that has caused a tactical shift in LÓ§w’s system: the implementation of a ‘False 9’.
A position first truly displayed by Francesco Totti under Luciano Spalletti at Roma in 2006, before it was brought to the next level by Lionel Messi under Guardiola, the false nine seems to be a system brought about by necessity rather than by choice. One thing that is true is that for it to be successful, you need a very talented and versatile player to occupy the role and Germany have multiple, with Mesut Ó¦zil, Mario GÓ§tze and of course Thomas Muller all having experience there. Ó¦zil was the most favoured in qualifying, finishing it as Germany’s top scorer in the process with 8 goals in 10 games.
However, it was indeed Muller that found himself in the role yesterday, but then you have to ask, did he really? Muller’s three goals, a penalty and two goals as a result of open play crosses, cannot vouch for this. Have we simply been blinded by tactical cliches? Does Germany’s system involve a false 9 at all? Is Thomas Muller simply a striker for LÓ§w’s side? The answer is probably a bit of both, but it was clear Muller was instructed to stay closer to goal than Ó¦zil would have been previously for Germany.
LÓ§w indeed has taken a brave shift in tactics this time round, and has abandoned a rigid machine for a more fluent and possibly more terrifying prospect at the latter stages of this competition. Joachim LÓ§w has now had four years to develop the formula to turn this side into world champions, and at this stage, you would not bet against him perfecting it in Brazil.
