In the opening years of the Second World War the Nazi forces marched from victory to victory thanks to its superior troops, armaments, and tactics. Toward the end of 1942, however, the tide began to turn against Hitler’s war machine. In North Africa Rommel’s offensive was halted and pushed back by the British while in the east the Wehrmacht were held up by the harsh winter and hardy Russian troops. At Stalingrad a decisive blow was struck as the German 6^th Army was encircled and entirely lost.

This defeat at Stalingrad, as well as at Moscow and El Alamein, shook the morale of the German troops and their allies. Hitler’s promise of the Third Reich’s manifest destiny and Aryan superiority was now badly shaken. Capitalising on this change in fortunes the Russian forces went on the offensive. In the opening months of 1943 they pushed the German Army back along the southern and central areas of the Eastern Front.

The advance was finally halted at the city of Kharkov after Field Marshal Eric von Manstein launched a counter-offensive against the Soviet Army’s overextended lines. A brief lull in fighting followed, allowing the armies to take stock of the new frontline and their current situation. While the Germans had begun the war with undoubtedly the best army, three years of fighting had worn away a great part of their veteran fighting force. Furthermore, the allies had been closing the gap in technological development.

Russian anti-tank rifle in use during fighting

In the face of a much larger and fresher Russian force many of the senior German military staff advocated a withdrawal to a more favourable position around the Ukraine and the adoption of a defensive posture in the region. Hitler, however, was still convinced that an iron will to win would defeat the supposedly weak Slavs and refused any backward step. At Hitler’s insistence German High Command searched for an offensive that would regain the initiative and momentum in the east. They soon set their sights on a bulge in the Eastern Front around the city of Kursk.

Pushing deep into their lines the Kursk salient was both an opportunity and a hindrance for the German forces. The bulge in their lines required more troops to secure while also making it harder to traverse and communicate across the front. If the salient could be cut off from the rest of the Russian frontline, however, the troops inside would be quickly forced to surrender, much like the German 6^th Army at Stalingrad.

It was therefore decided to try and sever the lines at the base of the salient with a pincer movement. German Army Group Centre would attack from the north while the newly formed Army Group South would drive up from the south to meet them east of Kursk, isolating the Soviet troops to the west. The high casualty rate on the Eastern Front had, however, resulted in a shortage of soldiers for the Wehrmacht. It would therefore fall to the armoured panzer divisions to carry the bulk of the fighting in the Kursk offensive; resulting in one of the largest tank battles in history.

German Panzer Mk IIIs and MK IVs at Kursk

The planned operation called for a quick strike against the Soviet positions before they could erect any serious defences or launch an attack of their own. Still reeling from the Russian offensive, however, the German forces wouldn’t be able to launch this operation until May at the earliest. This delay made many members of German High Command apprehensive of the plan’s viability; especially as evidence began to flood in of growing Russian defensive positions.

In early May, Hitler convened a meeting of his senior staff and advisors to discuss the viability of an offensive against Kursk, which had been christened Operation Citadel. Though many members of the meeting spoke out against the plan it was decided it should be merely postponed. The hope was that the new generation of German tanks, used in sufficient number, would negate the Russian defences. This belief in new technology saw Operation Citadel increasingly postponed until the eventual start date of July 5^th; more than two months after the initial launch date.

Though these new tanks would prove to be some of the best of the war, the Tiger and Panther especially, they would do little to the Russian’s massive defence network. Following the Battle of Kharkov Stalin’s generals urged the adoption of a defensive stance. With logic similar to that of Hitler’s staff they argued that more damage could be done catching the Germans on the counter-offensive. Yet Stalin was, like Hitler, reluctant to leave the initiative in the hands of his opponent.

Panther battalion attached to Grossdeutschland Division  

Through an intricate underground network known as the Lucy spy ring this information was passed from British Intelligence to their Russian counterparts in the Soviet Union. Stalin and his commanders put this knowledge to great use across the Eastern Front. At Kursk the knowledge of German plans and intentions allowed the Soviet forces to comfortably expend men, material, and time on entrenching their position.

The Russians, however, had a secret weapon on their side. Before the outbreak of the Second World War the Polish Cipher Bureau had made great headway in decrypting the German’s Enigma code. With war on the horizon the Poles shared their work with the British and French. The British quickly put this knowledge to use at their code breaking centre in Bletchley Park and soon the German’s secret communications, including military plans and movements, were being clearly read by Downing Street and British High Command.

As a result when the offensive final got underway in July the German forces were met by miles and miles of minefields, ditches, barbed-wire and tank-traps, entrenched troops, anti-armour guns, machinegun bunkers, and dug-in enemy armour. These massive defences would prove to be too much of an obstacle for the Wehrmacht and the now infamous Panzer divisions.

A Tiger I scoring a direct hit on a T-34

Despite having superior intelligence and the benefit of this massive defensive network, however, the Russian victory would be, once again, won with numerical superiority. At the outset of the battle the Red Army had roughly twice the number of men than the Germans and outnumbered them in armour and artillery by approximately three-to-one. These numbers would be vital as the Germans proved their martial and technological prowess once again.

On the 5^th of July the offensive began. Over the next eleven days the area to the north and south of Kursk would be engulfed in battle as these two great forces clashed. In the air the Luftwaffe and Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily vied for control of the skies as their pilots rained destruction from bomb and cannon on the men and tanks bellow. Meanwhile the infantry and artillery of the Wehrmacht and Red Army battled for control of vitally important land.

It was the tanks, however, that dominated the battlefield of Kursk. Tigers and Panthers led the German forces, tearing through the Russian defences with their thick armour and massive guns. The rough but formidable T-34s and KV-1s were the main force sent against these beasts. Though not as dangerous as the German armour these mass-produced Soviet machines were very capable and had the weight of numbers on their side.

Russian troops use the advancing T-34s as cover during a counter-attack

This numerical advantage was direly needed as the tide of German armour washed over the Russian positions. As the superior Teutonic tanks crept forward mile by mile the Red Army called on its vast reserves to hold the line. Though the Reich’s forces were kept out it was at a high cost; some historians estimate that Russian losses were more than three times that of Germany. By July 16^th the news of an Allied landing at Sicily and increased pressure in the west forced Hitler and Germany to abandon the offensive and they withdrew to their original lines.

This was the first time a serious German offensive had failed to penetrate into its strategic depths and marked another milestone on the road to the fall of the Third Reich. What’s more, however, the German forces failed to comprehend the full strength of the Russian forces in the area and were caught off guard by the coming counter-offensive. This Soviet drive wouldn’t be easily stopped and cost the German’s a great deal of vital territory, men, machines, and munitions as well as the initiative for the rest of the war.

Listen back to ‘Talking History’ as Patrick talks to a panel of experts about the Battle of Kursk. Why did Hitler insist on an attack in this region? Were the tanks really that great and important? What was the ultimate result of Operation Citadel? And could the German forces have ever won?